INTRODUCTION
The tension between state legislation and the Commerce Clause is deeply rooted in United States' legal history. 1 As is true in life as well as law, alcohol's involvement has made the situation both more interesting and more contentious. 2 Because the Twenty-first Amendment constitutionalized state-level alcohol regulation, the tension between states' robust alcohol regulatory schemes and the Commerce Clause's proscription of state-level regulation of national commerce has been particularly sharp. 3 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment, and stating that "[t]he transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited"); id. amend. XVIII, repealed by id. amend. XXI (prohibiting the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors"). See generally Lauzon, supra note 2 (listing cases demonstrating tension between the Commerce Clause and state regulation of the alcohol industry).
farmers within the state. 10 For example, in order to promote its brewery-related agricultural sectors, New York's law requires that farm brewers source 20% of their hops and barley from within the state for the first five years after the law's enactment, then 60%, then eventually 90% after twenty years. 11 As of June 2, 2014, thirty-five farm breweries operate in New York, which includes twenty-two established in 2013 alone. 12 Yet here familiar Commerce Clause jurisprudence sounds again: if out-ofstate hop and barley farmers wish to sell to these new brewers, they will face significant hurdles. 13 Likewise, if these brewers source more than the approved quantity of out-of-state ingredients, they violate their license.
14 Moreover, if 10 See id. § § 3, 51-a, 56; N.Y. TAX LAW § 1136(i)(1)(C) (McKinney 2014) (exempting farm breweries, wineries, cideries, and distilleries from tax filing provisions relating to information regarding sales of alcoholic products); NEW YORK STATE LIQUOR AUTH., COMPLYING WITH NEW YORK'S ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW-A GUIDE FOR WINERIES AND (Feb. 3, 2014) , available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-72-percentincrease-taste-ny-farm-based-beverage-licenses-2011, archived at http://perma.cc/NNB3-XKQK ("There are currently 26 licensed farm breweries in New York, with more than a dozen applications currently in the pipeline.") (emphasis added). 13 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § § 3, 51-a; Cleveland, supra note 12 (quoting several complaints that soon New York's brewery-related agriculture will not be able to withstand growing demand); infra note 151-154 and accompanying text (addressing various concerns that New York's brewery related agriculture cannot meet the increase in demand that will be caused by the farm brewery law's graduating in-state sourcing requirements). 14 New York's agricultural infrastructure cannot fully handle the increased demand, problems will abound. 15 This Note argues that although New York and other states deserve praise for attempting to accommodate the art and industry of craft beer, they must do so constitutionally. 16 Furthermore, this Note argues that protectionism is contrary both to the spirit of entrepreneurship and to the spirit of the craft beer revolution. 17 Part I provides the historical backdrop on which this battle is fought. 18 It examines the role of the dormant Commerce Clause, the function of the Twenty-first Amendment, and the tension between these provisions as altered in 2005 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Granholm v. Heald. 19 Part II focuses on New York's farm brewery law and compares it to the distribution laws that the Supreme Court struck down in Granholm. 20 Part III argues that New York's farm brewery license violates the dormant Commerce Clause and cannot be saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. 21 Finally, it suggests that states should instead pursue simple deregulation as a way to foster craft breweries constitutionally.
I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, STATE REGULATION, AND ALCOHOL:
A STORY OF TENSION
The Commerce Clause is a primary font of congressional power. 23 By way of over two centuries of changing economic landscapes and expansive judicial interpretation, it has produced a vast federal legislative and regulatory framework. 24 This federal regulatory framework often and inevitably conflicts with state regulatory schemes. 25 The resulting tension is particularly evident 15 See infra notes 151-154 and accompanying text (explaining potential agricultural deficiencies in the farm brewery scheme). 16 See infra notes 185-268 and accompanying text. 17 See infra notes 185-268 and accompanying text. 18 See infra notes 23-104 and accompanying text. 19 See infra notes 23-104 and accompanying text. 20 See infra notes 105-184 and accompanying text. 21 See infra notes 185-268 and accompanying text. 22 See infra notes 252-268 and accompanying text. 23 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . ."); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949) ("The Commerce Clause is one of the most prolific sources of national power and an equally prolific source of conflict with legislation of the state."). 24 See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995) (finding that this steady expansion of congressional power under the Commerce Clause was due in part to the "recognition of the great changes that had occurred in the way business was carried out in this country. Enterprises that had once been local or at most regional in nature had become national in scope."). 25 See id. at 553-54 ("[T]he Court's Commerce Clause decisions dealt but rarely with the extent of Congress' power, and almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state legislation that discriminated against interstate commerce."); H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 534-35 (demonstrating the conflict between state legislation and Congress's plenary power to regulate interstate commerce).
with regard to alcohol regulation because the Twenty-first Amendment constitutionalizes state-level regulation of the alcohol industry. 26 This Part tells one sliver of this storied friction in three Sections. 27 First, Section A briefly explains the origin, purpose, and scope of what is commonly referred to as the dormant Commerce Clause.
28 Section B examines the history and current standing of the Twenty-first Amendment vis-à-vis the dormant Commerce Clause, and reviews how states have regulated the alcohol industry since its ratification. 29 Finally, Section C explores how the U.S. Supreme Court handled these opposing forces in its most recent treatment of the topic. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate commerce "among the several States." 31 The U.S. Supreme Court, in some of its earliest cases, interpreted this positive power to also negate state action that interferes with interstate commerce or regulates it as only Congress may.
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This logical corollary, commonly called the "dormant" Commerce Clause, has served as a jurisprudential tool of choice in the effort to harmonize a national economy populated by self-interested and highly sovereign states. 33 The doctrine essentially teaches that states cannot adversely affect the cohesion and fluidity of a single, national economy-that is, they cannot economically Balkanize the nation. 33 H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 535 ("Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written word, this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to these great silences of the Constitution."). 34 See id. at 537-38 ("This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control the economy, including the vital power of erecting customs barriers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units.") The point here, at heart of the doctrine and at the heart of this Note, is that the Constitution guarantees a single, unified, unobstructed national economy-that the Framers intended as much, and Violations of the dormant Commerce Clause typically come in two forms, with two corresponding levels of judicial scrutiny. 35 First, there are state laws that, even if facially neutral, discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or effect. 36 These are held to heightened scrutiny with an almost insurmountable presumption of invalidity. 37 Second, there are state laws that merely burden interstate commerce. 38 These are instead subjected to a more lenient that this power was considered to be one of the most essential contrasts to the failed Articles of Confederation. 323-24 (2010) . A state law can discriminate against interstate commerce in three ways: either facially (that is, discriminatory in its very language), effectually (that is, it appears neutral but it has a discriminatory effect), or purposefully (actually passed with a discriminatory purpose). See Thompson, supra at 523-24. In reality, plaintiffs allege (and defendants defend) dormant Commerce Clause challenges with a large variety of interlocking doctrines relating to whether certain industries are "similarly situated," whether the state benefit is a tax subsidy (and under Supreme Court jurisprudence, sometimes immune from the dormant Commerce Clause), or whether a law's intent (and the means of determining that intent) need be distinct from-or is related to-the laws' effect. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298-99 (1997) ("Although this central assumption [that discrimination assumes substantially similar entities] has more often than not itself remained dormant in this Court's opinions on state discrimination subject to review under the dormant Commerce Clause . . . there is a threshold question whether the companies are indeed similarly situated for constitutional purposes."); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) ("Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition [of regulating interstate commerce clause in a discriminatory way] . . . ."); Jenkins, 592 F.3d at 11 n.11, 13-14 (2010) (noting potentially important distinctions made by courts between a challenged law's effect and its purpose, and describing a holistic methodology for determining a law's purpose). For purposes of both brevity and relevance, this Note does not fully flesh out these (and other) nuances in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence; rather, this Note argues that the New York farm brewery law-given its facial and effectual discriminatory aspects, and given that New York and out-of-state hop farmers are obviously "similarly situated"-remains unconstitutional even in light of these defenses. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § § 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533) (explicitly regulating similarly situated economic actors to the determinant of out-of-state actors and to the benefit of in-state actors); infra notes 185-268 and accompanying text. 37 See O'Grady, supra note 35, at 573-74. This is not to say that the Court simply invalidates all facially discriminatory state laws without inquiry. See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151. Instead, the Court applies a strict test whereby the government must show that the law, though discriminatory, serves a non-discriminatory, a non-protectionist purpose, which itself could not be effectuated without a less discriminatory method. In explaining which of these two levels of scrutiny apply, the Court has defined "discrimination" straightforwardly. 41 A state law is discriminatory if it treats in-state and out-of-state economic interests differently so as to benefit the former and burden the latter. 42 Notably, discriminatory laws in this context do not have to be intentional or malicious, although evidence of either intent or malice is predictably relevant. 43 Instead, they merely need to treat a kind of commerce differently because of its state identity.
44 By formulating such a broad jurisprudence, the Court arguably takes a hard, more scrutinizing look at discriminatory state laws in the dormant Commerce Clause context than in others. 45 Clarity, however, is not the dormant Commerce Clause's virtue. 46 States continue to test its amorphous boundaries, and courts continue to struggle with its application. 47 Changing economies and industries only further complicate 39 See 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."); Thompson, supra note 36, at 323. 40 See O'Grady, supra note 35, at 574. A finding that a state law is in fact discriminatory is almost always fatal to that law; the chance the state is afforded to demonstrate otherwise is, as one scholar puts it, "illusory." Id. at 574 n.12 (citing multiple cases where courts have struck down state laws on a per se basis upon a finding of discrimination under a Commerce Clause analysis). The test of whether a law is in fact discriminatory is however unclear. See Thompson, supra note 36, at 323. If the law makes it past this stage without invoking the heightened standard, its chances of survival are greatly increased. Denning, supra note 37, at 422 (describing the Pike balancing test-whereby the challenger of a law must prove that that the burdens on interstate commerce are clearly excessive in relation to putative benefits-as deferential); O'Grady, supra note 35, at 574. 41 See O'Grady, supra note 35, at 578. 42 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) ("As we use the term here, 'discrimination' simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid."); see O'Grady, supra note 35, at 578. 43 See O'Grady, supra note 35, at 578. This indifference to-or more precisely, the unnecessariness of-intent as an element of discrimination in the dormant Commerce Clause context contrasts with the concept of discrimination in other constitutional contexts, such as Equal Protection, in which a law's intent to discriminate against a class of persons is highly relevant. See id. at 578 n.26. 44 Id. 45 regulated the alcohol industry before Prohibition, the constitutionalization of this practice solidified an arguably unprecedented authority to do so as aggressively as they wished. 55 Although such a doctrine may seem odd today, one must understand that public and governmental distrust of the alcohol industry persisted despite enormous dissatisfaction with Prohibition. 56 Fears of organized crime and widespread intemperance-sentiments that spurred Prohibition in the first place-endured. 57 To protect against such evils it was thought necessary to allow states the power to regulate every aspect of the industry, including the power to prohibit alcohol. 58 As a result, the alcohol industry emerged from the shadows of Prohibition as one of the most heavily and sporadically regulated sectors of the economy. 59 As is to be expected with heavy state regulation, liti- 55 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (articulating a view that the Twenty-first Amendment provides states with nearly unmitigated authority to regulate alcohol); see infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text (explaining the perspective that the Twenty-first Amendment grants states near-plenary power to regulate alcohol). 56 . This report polled expert and public opinion towards the alcohol industry and in turn laid the intellectual foundation upon which modern state alcohol regulation would be founded. See Tomayo, supra note 56, at 2209-11. One key tenet of this foundation was a robust licensing system for alcohol manufactures. See id.; see also Yablon, supra note 56, at 555-67 (describing the social context and content of the prohibition movement); infra notes 111-137 (outlining New York brewery licensing scheme). 58 See Yablon, supra note 56, at 594-95 ("In the period following the repeal of Prohibition, alcohol consumption in the country was at the lowest levels it had ever been and many states remained completely dry long after repeal. Oklahoma did not repeal its statewide Prohibition until 1959 and Mississippi remained dry until 1966."); Tomayo, supra note 56, at 2209-11; see also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 494-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (" [T] he moral condemnation of the use of alcohol as a beverage represented not merely the convictions of our religious leaders, but the views of a sufficiently large majority of the population to warrant the rare exercise of the power to amend the Constitution on two occasions.") Also demonstrating the social mores of the time, the Twenty-first Amendment is the only constitutional amendment to have been ratified by the people in state conventions, rather than by state legislatures. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 497 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 59 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing as examples certain state laws regarding alcohol, including prohibition of sale on Sundays, prohibition of hard liquor specifically, and the infamous three-tier system). The three-tier system, adopted at least in part in every state, is gation flourished-litigation which to this day continues to etch out the exact boundaries of state authority under the Twenty-first Amendment. 60 Meanwhile, roughly over the last thirty years and most prominently in the last ten, a highly popular craft beer revolution has taken the alcohol industry by storm. 61 In just a few decades, the American beer landscape has been transformed from one in which a few large breweries dominated the market with largely indiscernible product to one populated by thousands of breweries representing unprecedented creativity, historical reinterpretation, variety, locality, and entrepreneurship. 62 This revolution has forever changed the culture and mechanisms of the beer industry, which no longer resemble the market as it was when the Twenty-first Amendment was enacted in 1933. 63 The laws and regulations stemming from the Second Provision are struggling to keep up. 64 one of the most litigated aspects of these states' laws. See Quigley, supra note 2, at 1882. Generally, the system, in an attempt to prevent crime or corruption and to encourage temperance, legally requires manufactures to sell only to wholesalers, who in turn sell to retailers, who in turn sell to consumers. Id. Vertical integration between these tiers is forbidden. (2013); History of Craft Brewing, supra note 4 ("The history of craft brewing saw America's brewing landscape start to change by the late-1970s. The traditions and styles brought over by immigrants from all over the world were disappearing. Only light lager appeared on shelves and in bars, and imported beer was not a significant player in the marketplace."). There were 2,403 breweries in operation for at least part of 2012 in the United States; forty-six percent of these breweries were microbreweries; and a majority of Americans by estimate live within ten miles of a brewery. Scott, supra at 417. These statistics are most compelling when compared to the fact that in 1979, there were only forty-four operating breweries in the U.S. See Tamayo, supra note 56, at 2212. Necessary to understanding the simultaneously consolidating nature of the brewing market is the fact that even though the number of small breweries has shot upward, so has the market share of the largest five breweries, which was 87.2% in 2001 
C. Alcohol and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Storied Rivalry, and
Granholm's "Reconciliation"
On one hand there is the dormant Commerce Clause, dictating national unity on economic policies. 65 On the other is the Second Provision of the Twenty-first Amendment, providing states an often utilized and constitutionally guaranteed right to regulate alcohol within their borders. 66 From such obvious adversity well over a hundred cases have sprung. 67 More specifically, the passage of the Eighteenth and the Twenty-first Amendments, along with the related Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, afforded alcohol special status in any Commerce Clause analysis. 68 That is, historically and constitutionally speaking, alcohol is not merely just another item in commerce. 69 And although the extent of this unique status remains the heart of the uncertain and unresolved tension between the Commerce Clause and Second Provision, today the Commerce Clause appears to be winning. 70 This trend is best told in two parts. 71 Subsection 1 discusses the Court's non-deferential treatment of alcohol regulation prior to the Temperance Movement and the Eighteenth Amendment. 72 It then examines the Court's early interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment as a blanket delegation of nearly plenary regulatory power to states. 73 Subsection 2 explains the Court's partial rejection of this old model and its adoption of a modern, balanced approach-and explains how this modern approach tilted even further in the Commerce Clause's favor in Granholm.
The Temperance Movement's Rise and Fall
Before the Temperance Movement garnered enough strength to pass the Eighteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court treated alcohol like any other commodity in interstate commerce. 75 It was thus subjected like any other commodity to the dormant Commerce Clause. 76 That is, the Court would strike down discriminatorily improper regulation of the national alcohol industry like it would any other similarly improper law-even those which today would seem perfectly commonplace. 77 Alcohol's quotidian status changed with the rise of the Temperance Movement. 78 The Temperance Movement in the United States was born out of growing public dismay over what was perceived to be alcohol's corrosive effect on societal morality. 79 Construing causation between intoxication and criminality, national opinion shifted dramatically enough to move Congress to action.
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The major acts Congress passed in response to this movement were the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, which essentially closed loopholes in state alcohol laws opened by the U.S. Supreme Court with various dormant Commerce Clause analyses. 81 In substance, these laws are congressional delega- 75 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476-78 (relating pre-Prohibition jurisprudence); Lauzon, supra note 2, § 2a at 164 ("Before the enactment of the Twenty-first Amendment, and disregarding the interlude of the Eighteenth Amendment, alcohol was treated as any other article of commerce, and therefore the power of the states to control the liquor traffic was subordinated to the right of free trade across state lines as embodied in the Commerce Clause."). 76 Although the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts vested in states strong and special regulatory power, they were rendered temporarily moot with the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. 83 With the alcohol industry banned, the dormant Commerce Clause was irrelevant in this context. 84 Prohibition turned out to be, however, a misguided disaster. 85 Thirteen years after its enactment, the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment, which also contained the aforementioned and troublesome Second Provision. 86 In the early cases interpreting the relationship between this Second Provision and the newly relevant dormant Commerce Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court held that states possessed near-plenary power to regulate alcohol as they wished. 87 The Second Provision of the Amendment was thus interpreted as a broad and nearly unqualified delegation of authority to states, immunizing alcohol regulations from the dormant Commerce Clause. 88 In other words, the Twenty-first Amendment was interpreted as a constitutionalized form of the Webb-Kenyon Act. 89 Though no longer banned, alcohol remained a very dif- 85 See Tamayo, supra note 56, at 2209 ("Prohibition brought an increase in organized crime and a wide and flagrant disregard for the law, which had the more subtle and pernicious effect of undermining public confidence and respect for police authority."). 86 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484. 87 See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936), abrogated by Granholm, 544 U.S. 460; see also Quigley, supra note 2, at 1879 (describing the Court's approach to the Twenty-first Amendment shortly after its passage as being highly deferential to state legislation). 88 See Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. at 62-63 (holding that had the challenged law been before the court before the Twenty-first amendment, it would have been struck under the Commerce Clause, but that this amendment "confer[s] upon the state the power to forbid all importations which do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes"). 89 See Veatch, supra note 76, at 120-21 (noting the similarity between the "Second Provision" and the Webb-Kenyon Act). ferent kind of commodity, and its regulators were afforded special deference. 90 This interpretation, however, would not last forever. 91 
The Modern Approach to the Second Provision
With continued pushback, this broad interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment eventually gave way to a more tempered approach. 92 It was replaced with a narrower reading of the Second Provision and a balancing test, dubbed by one observer the "modern accommodation standard rule."
93 According to this approach, courts do not simply uphold any state regulation of alcohol as valid under the Second Provision, but instead determine 1) whether the regulation violates the dormant Commerce Clause, and if it does 2) whether the regulation can be "saved" by the Second Provision. 94 To determine whether the Second Provision will in fact rescue the endangered law, the court determines whether the "core concerns" of the Twenty-first Amendment are implicated by the state's regulation. 95 Although undefined, these "core con- 95 See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) ("The two North Dakota regulations fall within the core of the State's power under the Twenty-first Amendment. In the interest of promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue, the State has established a comprehensive system for the distribution of liquor within its borders. That system is unquestionably legitimate."); Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 404 ("This is commonly referred to as the 'core concerns' test, which entails assessing whether state statutes reflect the 'central purpose' or the 'core concern' of the Twenty-First Amendment, viz., the promotion of temperance. Some courts have also recognized the prevention of monopolies or organized crime from (re)gaining control of the alcohol industry and the collection of taxes as other policies effectuated by the Twenty-First Amendment.");
cerns" have included the promotion of temperance, market orderliness, and revenue. 96 With frequent application, it seems this more balanced approach has been firmly established as the modern mechanism by which courts analyze dormant Commerce Clause challenges in the alcohol industry. 97 Importantly, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently ruled on states' regulatory power over the alcohol industry in Granholm.
98 There, the Court found New York and Michigan distribution laws that afforded in-state wineries the right to sell product directly to consumers while denying this privilege to out-of state wineries unconstitutional. 99 Although the Court did not explicitly overrule its precedent, it did strike the challenged distribution laws as violations of the dormant Commerce Clause without explicitly appealing to the "core interests" of the Twenty-first Amendment. 100 Instead, it mentioned the test in passing and moved on without explicitly applying it.
101 Thus, it would seem that appeal to these core interests is no longer a necessary component of the modern approach.
102 If this is the case, the Court in Granholm has built a new framework, one which affords the Second Provision even less deference, and which steps a bit further away from those forces which disturbed the dormant Commerce Clause in the first place. 103 The "modern accommodation rule" would therefore imply a process whereby the Court bends the Twenty-first Amendment to accommodate the Commerce Clause-limiting prior language mandating balance, and imperiling states' rights to regulate alcohol freely.
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Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The core interests protected by the Twentyfirst Amendment are described as the States' interests in promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue, all in connection with the manufacture, shipment, and use of alcoholic beverages.") (internal quotations omitted); Lauzon 104 Compare Granholm, 544 U.S. at 486 ("Our more recent cases, furthermore, confirm that the Twenty-first Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the rule that States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own producers."), with Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332 ("Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.").
II. THE "FARMER BREWER": A NEW KIND OF LICENSE, AN OLD KIND OF SCRUTINY.
State regulation of the alcohol industry is extensive, varied, and sporadic. 105 It is also, much like the industry itself, a frequently changing area of the law. 106 As breweries, wineries, and distilleries continue to evolve, so too do those laws which regulate their trade. 107 This Part looks at one specific instance of this evolution in the brewing context: the recently-enacted New York Farmer Brewer License.
108 Section A examines how this license changes the law of brewing in New York and compares it to similar legislation proposed or enacted in Massachusetts and Maryland.
109 Section B then places the law in the dormant Commerce Clause context, elucidating some of the law's potential constitutional improprieties.
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A. A New Kind of Brewing License
Effective January 14, 2013, a new kind of brewing license exists in New York.
111 Dubbed a "farm brewery license," it is both cheaper than a standard brewer's license and allows the licensee certain privileges in exchange for compliance with specific rules.
112 In large part this new license is modeled after the state's 1976 "Farm Winery Act," and seeks to advance many of the same goals-namely, the encouragement and protection of New York industries, the increase of demand for locally sourced ingredients, and the expansion of tourism. 114 This designation is the heart of the new license. 115 "New York state labelled beer" is beer that, until the end of year 2018, is brewed with at least 20% New York-grown hops and "other ingredients" (meaning, in effect, mostly barley). 116 The label then has a graduating effect: starting January 1, 2019, the percentage requirements are increased to 60% for both hops and barley, and then from January 1, 2024 and beyond, to 90%.
117
In exchange, farm breweries meeting these requirements are afforded exclusive privileges.
118 Most pertinently, they pay lower annual licensing fees and are exempted from "burdensome" tax rules that would otherwise require them to file information relating to sales tax.
119 New York farm brewers may ups-and-down-of-farm-to- 119 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 56 (listing an annual licensing fee of $320 for farm breweries and $4,000 for traditional breweries producing more than 75,000 barrels per year); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1136(i)(1)(C) (McKinney 2014) (exempting farm breweries, wineries, cideries, and distilleries from tax filing provisions relating to information regarding sales of alcoholic products); Legislation, supra note 113 (explaining that the tax filing requirement from which farm breweries are exempted is "costly and burdensome," and that many farm breweries had "struggled to afford the costs of complying" with the requirement); see also Gail Cole, New York Exempts Farm Breweries from Tax Filing Requirements, TAXRATES.COM (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.taxrates.com/blog/2012/10/30/new-york-exempts-farm-breweries-from-tax-filingrequirements/, archived at http://perma.cc/64JE-22V5 (explaining that farm breweries are exempted from certain tax filing requirements in order to "support local businesses"). Moreover, farm breweries may arguably sell both their own and other New York state labeled beer (and cider) at retail for on-premise consumption without accompanying requirements that also, with no additional licensing, conduct tastings of New York labelled wine, cider, and liquor, and may sell these products at retail for off-premise consumption. 120 Although New York recently extended to all brewers the privilege to sell their product at retail for on-premise consumption (an important privilege previously enjoyed exclusively by farm brewers), it remains clear that the farm brewery license, albeit now less attractive, grants its holder more economic flexibility.
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Although the New York license is the most developed of its kind, it is not unique, as Massachusetts and Maryland (and potentially New Jersey) have similar schemes.
122 Massachusetts, for example, issues a "farmer-brewery license" to applicants for the "purpose of encouraging the development of domestic farms."
123 Similar to the New York scheme, the Massachusetts farmer brewery license allows for special privileges not extended to the standard "Manufacturing of Wine and Malt Beverage" license. 124 In addition to simply being cheaper, these privileges include the right to sell beer made by the brewery at retail for off-premise consumption, and immunization from pre- Largely unused until the craft beer revolution began full force, it remained a difficultto-apply measure, with the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission ("ABCC") attempting to require at least some in-state sourcing, which proved infeasible given the Commonwealth's poor ecology for grain cultivation. See id. Though a new "brewpub" license was passed to help alleviate the concerns, the farmer-brewers license was never rescinded, and remains today the license of choice for Massachusetts craft breweries given its extension of benefits without exaction of cost. See id. The spirit of the law remains, however, rather unsatisfied given its original purpose. 127 This is because, unlike the New York license, the Massachusetts law does not specifically quantify the percentage of local ingredients needed to satisfy the license's conditions. 128 When the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission issued an advisory opinion denying a license to the then-upstart Idle Hands Brewery, it attempted to assert a new rule requiring a minimum fifty percent in-state sourcing requirement. 129 With ample backlash from legislators and the brewing community, however, the rule floundered, allowing for the continued operation of farm breweries without any special sourcing requirements.
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Maryland's recently-enacted Farm-Brewery license also lacks New York's specific source-percentage quantification. 131 Like the Massachusetts and New York schemes, the Maryland farm brewery license allows holders certain privileges-on-site consumption and retail sales of growlers, cases, and kegs-in exchange for brewing their beer with "an ingredient from a Maryland agricul- 125 See id. § § 19, 19c; see also John P. Connell, The Different Types of Brewery Licenses in Massachusetts, LAW OFFICES OF JOHN P. CONNELL, P.C., http://www.connelllawoffices.com/the-differenttypes-of-brewery-licenses-in-massachusetts/, archived at http://perma.cc/83YB-GHVS (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). These quotas, applicable to the standard Manufacturing license, limit the total number of licenses available to pour alcoholic beverages in a given area. See Connell, supra. Immunization from such a quota therefore guarantees the famer-brewer the right to pour beer on-premises-a guarantee the standard license, distinct from any legislative purpose of promoting local farms, is without. See id. 126 131 MD. CODE. ANN., ALCO. BEV. § 2-209 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (requiring only that a farm brewery's product "be manufactured with an ingredient from a Maryland agricultural product, including hops, grain, and fruit, produced on the licensed farm"). tural product."
132 Finally, proposed legislation in New Jersey would create a cheap "farm brewery license," the details of which remain hazy but which would, in present form, require the licensee to grow on-site ingredients used in the manufacture of the beer. 133 Thus, although the New York farm-brewery license does not stand alone, it is the most quantified and elaborate of its kind. 134 Predictably, public reaction to the new license has been mixed. 135 Despite uncertainties of the law's viability, however, it has led to rapid expansion: since it took effect in January of 2013, at least thirty five farm breweries have opened in New York, contributing to a doubling of hop acreage in the state. 136 Given the nature of the still-booming craft beer revolution, this expansion can only be expected to grow-at least while the farms can produce amply, and while the law remains unchallenged.
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B. An Old Kind of Constitutional Scrutiny
Although, like its counterparts in other states, New York's farm brewery license has yet to be constitutionally challenged, it likely will be.
138 This Section foreshadows that challenge and explores how courts are likely to examine the law.
139 Subsection 1 discusses the reasons for challenging the farm brewery license scheme. . 134 See supra notes 111-121 and accompanying text (describing the New York farm brewery license and its graduating in-state source requirements). 135 See, e.g., Gravina, supra note 113 (expressing reservations about the law); supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing various concerns with the law). Much of this criticism comes not necessarily from the purpose of the law, but rather its ecological feasibility. See Gravina, supra note 113. Some maintain that New York will be unable to meet the increased demand this law will impose on farmers, and argue that the effects will be felt by the far more belabored barley market in New York (relative to the more robust hop market). See Cleveland, supra note 12; Gravina, supra note 113; supra note 12 and accompanying text. 136 See Cleveland, supra note 12 (reporting the number of farm breweries as of June 2, 2014); see also Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12 (noting that hop acreage has doubled as of October 9, 2013). 137 See Cleveland, supra note 12; Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, supra note 12. See generally Cibula, supra note 62 (providing an overview of the tight nexus between the brewing and agricultural sectors). 138 Cf. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 465-66 (challenging a discriminatory New York law); see infra notes 142-158 and accompanying text (outlining the complaints likely to be lodged against the license from both out-of-state farmers and local farm breweries). 139 See infra notes 142-184 and accompanying text. 140 See infra notes 142-158 and accompanying text.
sourcing requirements to the distribution schemes that have already undergone stringent constitutional analysis. 141
The Motivation for Challenge
At first blush, New York's farm brewery license seems a creative and reasonable legislative adaptation to a new kind of brewing phenomenon.
142 Generally speaking, the response from the brewing community has been positive, encouraging, and excited-earning an implicit stamp of approval from the New York State Brewers Association and the national Brewers Association.
143
At second glance, however, concerns begin to emerge. 144 For example, although a requirement that hops and other ingredients be sourced from instate farms certainly benefits those farms, a necessary secondary effect is that out-of-state farms will suffer weakened demand from a growing sector of New York's brewing industry. 145 This effect is compounded by the license's graduating scheme. 146 In other words, until the end of 2018, out-of-state farms will be forced to compete for 80% of a farm brewery's malt and hop requirements; starting January 1, 2019, these out-of-state farms will then be forced to compete for only 40% of New York farm brewery's demand; finally, starting January 1, 2024, merely 10% of the farm brewery's sourcing demands will be open to out-of-state farmers.
147
This restriction placed on out-of-state farmers will be of course partially alleviated by the continued expansion of the ranks of New York farm breweries, but in the final analysis such expansion further compounds the prohibitive effect. 148 With the opening of each additional farm brewery, an eventual ninety percent of that brewery's additional sourcing demand is fenced off from all . 14, 2015) . 143 See Legislation, supra note 113; N.Y. Governor Cuomo Signs Craft-Friendly Bill, supra note 142. But see Cleveland, supra note 12 (expressing doubts about the law's feasibility in its current form, given the burdens placed on New York farms). Brewers associations are essentially trade guilds that seek to promote craft beer policies and best practices, and have become increasingly influential with the rise of the craft beer movement. See Purpose, BREWERS ASS'N, http:// www.brewersassociation.org/brewers-association/purpose/, archived at http://perma.cc/V5JJ-FKTG (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). The Brewers Association is the largest and most influential of its kind. See id. 144 See infra notes 145-158. 145 See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 3. If by definition "New York state labelled beer" is made up of primarily NY ingredients, then the logical corollary is that it is not primarily made up of out-ofstate ingredients. See id. 146 See id. § 51-a. Perhaps a better word is "accelerated." See id. 147 See id. 148 See id.
non-New York farms. 149 The law therefore benefits some and neglects others. 150 Moreover, the neglected out-of-state farmers may not be the only ones to complain.
151 Indeed, there is credible concern that New York farms will be unable to withstand the increased demand from emerging farm breweries, especially as that demand is exponentially increased via the step-like nature of the law. 152 If such ingredients are simply wanting-or if limited supply and increased demand lead to prices so high as to be unobtainable by an inherently small farm brewery-the law's prohibition on selling non-New York state labeled beer might face a challenge from the farm breweries themselves. 153 This precise concern, after all, prompted the vehement backlash from Massachusetts breweries when that state's Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission attempted to bolster its own farm brewery licensing mechanism with actual in-state sourcing requirements.
154
Thus the New York law, as it stands, might prompt a disagreeable response and consequently birth a new round of litigation challenging state alco- 149 See id. 150 See id. 151 See O'Grady, supra note 35, at 578-79 (hypothesizing a challenge by in-state bakeries against a fictional state law requiring in-state ingredients). It is important not to overstate the issue, for in New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, and New Jersey there are other licensing mechanisms unencumbered by sourcing requirements (though encumbered by different requirements, such as a higher cost). See Connell, supra note 125; see also MD. CODE. ANN., ALCO. BEV. § 2-209 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (outlining production brewery license requirements in Maryland). Although these alternative (or traditional) licensing and permit schemes do alleviate some of the harm done to out-of-state farmers, the point remains that these out-of-state farmers are, insofar as the New York farm brewery market is concerned, barred significant access. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § § 3, 51-a (West, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 504, 506 to 508, 510 to 523, 525 to 533). 152 See Gravina, supra note 113 (characterizing the New York agricultural infrastructure as "woefully under equipped to even meet the first quota" mandated by the law). New York's law-unlike some of its peers-does not require that farm breweries be located on actual farms, which expands their potential numbers and increases the burden on the already-strained infrastructure. See N.Y. AL-CO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 51-a (authorizing non-farm breweries to hold farm brewery licenses); Gravina, supra note 113. Nor will this be a problem easily solved: barley-a principal ingredient in beer and subject to the law's sourcing requirements-does not grow well in New York's climate. See Gravina, supra note 113. Further, hops-a second principal ingredient and also subject to sourcing requirements-are more easily grown in New York, but at present the farms are far smaller than their larger Pacific Northwest or European competitors, and are arguably incapable of handling the increase in demand sure to come from their exclusive access to farm breweries. See id; see also Farm Breweries Growing Fast in New York, supra note 12 ("The problem these breweries may face, of course, is that those ingredients simply may not exist.") 153 See Cleveland, supra note 12 (noting complaints from several farm brewers that the New York sourcing requirement will have to be changed if the license is to remain economically feasible). 154 See Deron, supra note 129; Crouch, supra note 123. During the immense public backlash against the Massachusetts ABCC's attempt to impose a fifty percent rule on Massachusetts farm breweries, critics cited the unsettling practice where a farm brewer in Massachusetts was forced to grow barley, for no purpose whatsoever, except to meet certain sourcing requirements. See Crouch, supra note 123; supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text. hol laws.
155 Should these problems in fact be encountered-and non-New York farmers seek to sell their goods to New York farm brewers-the most obvious legal challenge that would follow will be grounded in the dormant Commerce Clause.
156
Such a new challenge is significant because, although much has been written both academically and judicially about the dormant Commerce Clause's application to alcohol distribution mechanisms (often in the context of wine), the Clause has yet to be applied to modern in-state sourcing requirements in the craft beer context. 157 Still, because the most pertinent and recent case law on this issue focuses on alcohol distribution, the farm brewery sourcing trend is best analyzed by analogy to this field. The alcohol industry is broadly regulated by a three-tier distribution system that has been adopted at least in part by all fifty states. 159 The three-tier scheme generally dictates that licensed manufacturers of alcoholic beverages must sell to licensed wholesalers, who in turn sell to licensed retailers for sale to the general public. 160 Prohibition of vertical integration between these tiers 155 Cf. Crouch, supra note 123 (detailing push back against sourcing requirements in Massachusetts). Though in New York the small initial backlash was not as strong as, for example, in Massachusetts, this is because Massachusetts attempted to retroactively apply the scheme to already-existing breweries; in contrast, it is possible that New York, applying a new scheme prospectively to new breweries, has merely yet to encounter similar resistance. See Gravina, supra note 113 (highlighting New York's under-equipped agricultural infrastructure and how it may fail to support the growing demand from New York farm breweries). 156 159 See id. at 466 (describing the three-tier distribution system); Quigley, supra note 2, at 1882 (same). 160 Quigley, supra note 2, at 1882.
is designed to promote temperance and prevent monopolization and consequent corruption.
161
Although the legitimacy of this system as a whole has been held perfectly valid, one of its particular iterations was struck down by the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision Granholm v. Heald. 162 That case examined tweaks both New York and Michigan implemented in their three-tier systems that allowed in-state wineries to bypass the system-that is, sell directly to consumerswhile denying the same privilege to out-of-state wineries. 163 The Court held that privileging only in-state wineries with direct access to consumers discriminated against out-of-state wineries, and consequently violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 164 It proceeded to hold that such a violation cannot be saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. 165 Thus, the most salient similarity between the New York farm brewery law and the struck distribution laws in Granholm is the implication of the Twentyfirst Amendment. 166 Because New York's law directly regulates the brewing industry, it will at least partially fall under constitutional protections guaranteed by the Second Provision. 167 To at least some extent, therefore, the New York farm brewery law will be analyzed not under a traditional dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence but instead, like in Granholm, in light of the more complex nexus between the Commerce Clause and the Second Provision of the Twenty-first Amendment.
168 161 See id. ("States offer several policy justifications for the three-tier system. Funneling distribution through the relatively small number of wholesalers facilitates excise tax collection. Prohibiting vertical integration theoretically helps 'prevent organized crime from gaining control of alcohol distribution.' By maximizing their oversight of distribution, states hope to limit illegal sales of alcohol to minors. Finally, by forcing the resale of alcohol through several tiers, states keep the price of alcohol artificially high, allegedly promoting temperance."); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, POSSIBLE ANTI-COMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE 5-6 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-report-concerning-possible-anticompetitivebarriers-e-commerce-wine/winereport2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DP7H-ZXSW (explaining the purposes and mechanisms of the three-tier distribution system while studying potential barriers to trade in the alcohol industry). 162 Additionally, both the laws struck in Granholm and the farm brewery law at issue here involve elements of protectionism. 169 The former laws were explicitly intended to protect in-state wineries, whereas the latter is explicitly intended to protect in-state farmers.
170 This is important because, as at least one scholar has noted, protectionism is a distinct issue in dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that deserves distinct analysis. 171 The Supreme Court has indeed directly addressed the role protectionism plays in the broader dormant Commerce Clause context.
172
A potentially important distinction, however, between the invalid law in Granholm and the farm brewery law at issue is the limited scope of the latter. 173 Under the New York law, out-of-state farmers may still sell to other kinds of breweries and may still, in a limited way, market to farm breweries. 174 Thus, unlike at least the Michigan law in Granholm, there is no absolute prohibition or denial of market access, only an encumbrance. 175 Nor, importantly, is the sourcing requirement imposed on all New York breweries: it merely applies to those operating under a specific type of license.
176 This limited and navigable aspect of the law is material given the Court's observation in Granholm's opening lines that direct sales were wholly "impractical" for outof-state wineries; obtaining a traditional license is not similarly "impractical" in New York. be implicated. 178 The invalidated distribution law in Granholm ran afoul the Commerce Clause by directly bestowing privileges exclusively on in-state wineries that it explicitly denied to out-of-state wineries. 179 This was, in effect, a direct legislative attempt to favor in-state wineries with legislation that could very well have also benefited out-of-state wineries. 180 In contrast, the farm brewery law extends benefits to certain kinds of in-state breweries that, only if accepted by the breweries, in turn have a secondary effect of burdening out-ofstate farmers. 181 In other words, a brewer seeking to enter the industry may become either a farm brewer or seek a more traditional license, and it is only upon the brewer's choice that New York ingredients are favored to their out-ofstate equivalents. 182 This additional step and element of choice was notably absent in the Granholm decision. 183 Thus there are both striking similarities and important differences between the three-tier distribution system struck down in Granholm and the newly signed New York farm brewery law. 184 
III. CRAFT SHOULD BE UNFETTERED: FARM BREWERY LAWS LIKE NEW YORK'S VIOLATE THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Responding to rapid changes in the craft beer industry, some states, most notably New York, have created brewing licenses that are protectionist, discriminatory, and wholly unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. 185 Farm brewery laws are unconstitutional when coupled with in-state sourcing requirements because they either require or potentially require licen-sees to eschew ingredients from out-of-state farms. 186 The stated intent of these licenses is to promote local industries to the detriment of other similarly situated-and unrepresented-non-local industries, which is the hallmark of dormant Commerce Clause violations. 187 Section A of this Part analyzes New York's license in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent formulation of the dormant Commerce Clause and Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence. 188 Section B then suggests a constitutional alternative that still promotes and supports the craft beer revolution: simple deregulation, sans burden. 189 
A. The Unconstitutionality of the Encumbered Farm Brewer
The protectionist and discriminatory nature of the farm brewery license is directly contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Granholm v. Heald, which examined the dormant Commerce Clause in the context of the alcohol industry. 190 In that case, the Court reaffirmed the waning nature of the Twenty-first Amendment's state-empowering Second Provision, and touched upon a two part test whereby these dueling constitutional provisions are balanced. 191 Specifically, the test requires courts to determine whether there has been a constitutional violation, and then whether the violation can be "saved" by the Second Provision. 192 Subsection 1 shows how the New York Farm Brewery Law violates the dormant Commerce Clause, and Subsection 2 explains why the Second Provision cannot save it. The most basic formulation of the dormant Commerce Clause is that laws may not discriminate against out-of-state economic interests to benefit in-state economic interests. 194 The first problem, therefore, is that despite this constitutional principle, the New York law economically burdens out-of-state farmers in order to benefit in-state farmers. 195 Under New York's farm brewery licensing scheme, out-of-state farmers are precluded from full access to the farm brewery market's demand for hops and other ingredients. 196 This denial is explicitly coupled with the protected access that in-state farmers enjoyprotection that, within the decade, will be nearly total. 197 Yet speaking directly to provisions it held invalid from the very same Farm Winery Act on which the Farm Brewery law is modeled, the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated another basic principle of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence: "The mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a producer in one State from access to markets in other States." 198 Shortly after, the Court declared unconstitutional laws that "deprive citizens of their right to have access to the markets of other States on equal terms."
199 Thus there is little doubt that explicit favoring of in-state farms to the exclusion of out-of-state farms is directly contrary to the "equal terms" the Court is mandated to enforce. 200 Just as the Court took issue with a requirement that an out-of-state winery would need to relocate to New York to fully avail itself of the New York market, so too would it strike a requirement that a Washington hop farmer would need to do the same. 201 It is, as has been oft-said, of the utmost and singular im-portance that our economy remain fluid and unencumbered. 202 Thus just as the Court found in Granholm "no difficulty concluding" that New York and Michigan laws that granted benefits to in-state wineries that it denied to out-of-state wineries were discriminatory, so too would it find with equal ease the New York farm brewery scheme equally as invalid. 203 Second, differences between the Granholm distribution law and the New York farm brewery law do not alleviate the latter's fundamental constitutional flaws. 204 For example, it is true that New York's farm brewery law does not completely ban imported ingredients, but instead only partially bans sales to a limited sector-that is, an eventual ninety percent ban on imports to farm breweries only. 205 This important distinction might quell out-of-state farmers' concerns about access to the New York brewery market. 206 Moreover, as stated, the farm brewery scheme is a less direct regulatory mechanism than the directshipping laws in Granholm: the brewers are the ones electing to bear the more restrictive license. 207 But the sweeping language of Granholm's reasoning compels the dismissal of these dissimilarities, especially given the nature of the New York law which that case struck down. 208 When analyzing the New York law specifically, the Court departed from its initial references to total obstruction and instead explicitly acknowledged the law's failure to "ban direct shipments altogether."
209 It observed that out-of-state wineries could avail themselves of many of the same rights as in-state wineries, but that such would require establishment of a physical presence-thus constituting an impermissible burden on market access. 210 Such language connotes the underlying principle that a law need not discriminate entirely, but merely discriminate to a degree sufficient to encum-ber market access. 211 And just as establishing a brick-and-mortar presence in the state was found far too great a burden, so too would be the establishment of an entire farm. 212 Third, the economic burdens placed on farm brewers present ample fodder for complaint from their perspective as well. 213 In other words, the farm brewer is presented with a choice: they can either enjoy access to the nation's hops and barley markets by applying (and paying) for the more traditional license, or instead accept the large barriers to market mandated by their current permit. 214 This burden on full market access to out-of-state producers-simply because those producers are out-of-state-clearly presents, per Granholm, sufficient actual discrimination for a valid constitutional challenge. 215 And because Granholm's language dismissed secondary permitting schemes as well as outright bans, the Court in effect maintained the well-established principle that distinctions-primary or secondary, direct or indirect-matter little if the law's actual effect is to discriminate. 216 For example, the 1970 U.S. Supreme Court decision Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. addressed in-state presence requirements akin to those in the farm brewery law. 217 That case addressed an Arizona law that mandated certain packaging requirements for exported fruits and vegetables to "protect and enhance the reputation of growers within the State." 218 The secondary effect of this law was to require a company which grew fruit in Arizona, but imported the fruit into California for packaging, to establish a packaging presence in Arizona. 219 This effect prompted a sharp response from the Court: "[T]he
Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere." 220 Thus, the same suspicion will befall the farm brewery law given its implicit requirement that farmers be located within the state to avail themselves of the full New York farm brewing market, despite potentially greater efficiency of those operations elsewhere. 221 More pertinently, this jurisprudence has extended explicitly to sourcing requirements. 222 For example, in its 1992 decision Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that required in-state power plants to use at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined coal. 223 Noting that Oklahoma in effect preferentially reserved a segment of its own coal market for its own miners, the Court found that such action "cannot be characterized as anything other than protectionist and discriminatory," and thus a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 224 Importantly, it continued to hold that the extent of discrimination-a "small portion" in Oklahoma's words-has no bearing on the all-important fact of discrimination. 225 No practical distinction can therefore be drawn between this invalid law and New York's, intended as it is to explicitly reserve for in-state farmers almost monopolized access to farm breweries-no matter how small that market may eventually be. 226 Thus New York's farm brewery law is discriminatory and, as a consequence, is virtually per se invalid. 227 Such discriminatory laws are nearly always founds to be fatal, as they cannot withstand the "exacting standard" articulated in Granholm. 228 The farm brewery law will not bear this standard, as there are plenty of other means of promoting an industry, simple deregulation just one among them. Because, ultimately, the New York farm brewery law regulates the intrastate alcohol industry, application of the dormant Commerce Clause does not end the analysis. 230 Though emasculated, the Twenty-first Amendment still affords at least some protection to state regulations of alcohol that violate the Commerce Clause. 231 Yet, the discriminatory nature of the New York farm brewery law cannot be cured by what are increasingly insignificant Twenty-first Amendment protections. 232 This is because, according to the "modern accommodation standard," courts reconcile the Second Provision with the dormant Commerce Clause by paying deference only to those state regulations that promote the Twenty-first Amendment's "core concerns." 233 These "core concerns" have remained remarkably undefined, but have included the promotion of temperance, market orderliness, and revenue-revenue typically meaning nondiscriminatory taxes or price fixations on intoxicating liquors. 234 Thus even discriminatory laws that regulate alcohol may survive a dormant Commerce Clause violation.
But no such central concerns are served by New York's farm brewery law. 236 The in-state sourcing requirement does not resemble price fixation or taxation and does not therefore implicate a "revenue" concern. 237 Moreover, the law's central purpose is the promotion of New York's agriculture, not a promotion of temperance, nor is a guarantor of market orderliness. 238 Further, because it is not entirely certain that a "core concern" test is even necessary, discriminatory laws are unlikely to receive any deference. 239 The U.S. Supreme Court in Granholm applied a purely traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis to the challenged distribution laws, implying an even less deferential standard than previously applied. 240 Under Granholm, the Court signaled that the Twenty-first Amendment simply does not protect or allow discrimination at all-that discrimination's per se invalidity under the dormant Commerce Clause applies with equal force to alcohol. 241 Thus this newest iteration of a long series of Twenty-first Amendment cases, couched as it is in a new formulation of the history of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, works to afford states even less deference-and all but seals the discriminatory farm brewery law's fate. 242 Finally, the Twenty-first Amendment's protection, even if its core concerns were implicated, is probably weaker with regard to the sourcing requirements. 243 Because ultimately the farm brewery law is, as the name im-plies, a law regulating brewing, the Twenty-first Amendment's protections of state-level regulatory control over alcohol are implicated. 244 The law in practice and purpose, however, works to directly promote and protect New York brewing agriculture more so than New York craft beer. 245 In other words, the farm brewery law discriminates not by directly regulating alcohol, but by regulating interstate commerce in hops and other brewing ingredients. 246 Yet facially, the Second Provision affords no protection to spirits' ingredients-only the final product stemming from those ingredients. 247 This face-saving Provision is therefore at least partly inapplicable to the farm brewery law, exposing a blatant intent to protect agricultural industry. 248 And protectionist measures in agricultural industries are a primary hunting ground for dormant Commerce Clause attacks. 249 This material difference therefore all but eviscerates any Twenty-first Amendment protections with which New York would seek to clothe the law, and with them any hope of judicial affirmance. 250 That is, without any constitutional protections rooted in the Twenty-first Amendment nor any guarantee that such protections would even matter, the violative law is bound to break underneath the immense weight of a great constitutional silence.
251
B. The Simpler Path: Deregulation
To avoid constitutional infirmities, New York and other states should instead promote craft beer through simple deregulation. 252 An across-the-board release of regulatory strictures does not implicate constitutional principles if effectuated evenhandedly. 253 Moreover, a releasing of market forces-and a shedding of the outdated ideology in which these laws are steeped-would better stimulate growth not just nationally, but locally as well. 254 For such is the very nature of the craft beer revolution: a return to locality. 255 The unconstitutionality of New York's farm brewery scheme does not stem from legislative intent to promote craft beer. 256 Indeed, the promotion and fostering of the craft beer industry and its revolution is a noble thing and should be a legislator's goal. 257 The unconstitutionality of the farm brewery scheme stems instead from its protectionist means of promoting craft beer. 258 It is not that New York's nascent and resurgent hop and barley industries should not be promoted, nor that regulations should not be lifted from smaller breweries, but instead that such goals can only be legally accomplished in a nondiscriminatory fashion that fosters the growth of the entire brewing communi- 251 Cf. id.; see supra notes 194-250 and accompanying text (explaining the unconstitutionality of the farm brewery license). 252 See Tamayo, supra note 56, at 2232-48 (suggesting a variety of ways North Carolina might deregulate its craft beer industry, including abolishing barrelage limits for self-distributing craft breweries and simplifying North Carolina franchise laws). 253 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 ("Time and again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.") (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 254 See id. at 494-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (espousing that the framers of the Twenty-first Amendment held a fundamentally different view of alcohol's danger and importance than do younger policy makers today). It would seem then important to recognize the fundamental shift in society's perspective on alcohol, to better allow today's laws to reflect today's mores. See id.; Tamayo, supra note 56, at 2218-21, 2235 (further explaining Justice Stevens' dissent and also reporting increased market penetration from craft breweries allowed to limitlessly self-distribute, without the encumbrance of legislative caps). 255 See History of Craft Brewing, supra note 4.
256
See supra notes 190-229 and accompanying text (explaining the unconstitutionality of New York's farm brewery law without attributing that unconstitutionality to the law's underlying intention to promote the art of craft beer). 257 See Tamayo, supra note 56, at 2228 (noting ample legislative recognition of the merits of craft beer promotion, including job creation, increased local taxation, and reduced environmental impacts). 258 See supra notes 190-229 and accompanying text (outlining the unconstitutionality of discriminatory means).
ty.
259 This is the only means by which the legislature can help foster growth without inviting litigation. 260 The promotion of farms must be done constitutionally, without implicating that balkanization the Supreme Court is mandated to prevent. 261 State laws simply cannot exclude one another and remain unchallenged. 262 Further, the simplicity of locality should serve as thematic inspiration: the immense patchwork of laws regulating the alcohol industry certainly testify to a need for a simpler marketplace. 263 One sector ripe for a loosening of control could be distribution and retail, which is already taking place across the country. 264 In New York this could mean granting all craft beer those privileges extended to farm breweries-as New York began to do in recent amendmentsand allowing the industries to promote themselves. 265 New York has a rich hop-growing heritage, and with the ever-increasing creativity of craft beer throughout the country, it is all but certain ample demand for New York hops will be generated with their continued expansion and redevelopment. 266 There is thus no need for protectionism. 267 The law should remove barriers to growth, not create them.
